PUBLISHED by YouGov yesterday, the above map caught my eye. Utilizing a 80,000-strong panel of voters, the pollsters have ranked 188 of the 206 native authority areas in England, Scotland and Wales by their propensity to vote for Brexit on the referendum on June twenty third. The consequence neatly illustrates the argument of my latest column on the demographics of the Europe vote. Upon getting observed the markedly pro-European leaning of Scotland and Wales (the product of left-leaning political traditions and a unique nationwide self-image to that of England), the following most hanging factor is Britain’s class-educational cut up. The Europhiles are most concentrated in these affluent cities and college cities (Bristol, Manchester, London, Oxford) with populations dominated by extremely educated professionals. Probably the most Eurosceptic areas are sometimes “left behind” ones (the Thames Estuary, declining coal mining areas and seaside cities) the place {qualifications} are poorer and work much less expert.
As such, the map caveats one of many Out campaigns’ doughtiest arguments: that voters are fed up with the union due to immigration. To make sure, the topic is extraordinarily salient. As I report within the column, voters “intensely involved” about it are 15 instances extra more likely to vote for Brexit. However its impact on the nation’s political outlook can also be sophisticated. Notice that essentially the most Europhile areas embody locations with numerous expertise of immigration (Lambeth, Southampton) and pretty little (the Scottish Highlands, the Wirral). Probably the most Eurosceptic locations are equally various: from comparatively monocultural Cumbria and Somerset to Lincolnshire and Peterborough with their many japanese European newcomers.
All of which belies the notion that Euroscepticism is merely a protest in regards to the burden positioned on public providers and labour markets by European immigrants, who pay into and take out of the state (although do extra of the previous than the latter) in (pro-EU) Brent and Sheffield simply as they do in (anti-EU) Lincoln and the Fens. What appears to matter extra is the financial and cultural surroundings into which they transfer. In locations used to heterogeneous populations (say, Leicester) and/or inhabited by liberal-minded college graduates (say, Newcastle) and/or affluent sufficient that residents don’t really feel threatened by low cost, if usually comparatively unskilled, newcomers (say, York) the immigration-Euroscepticism transmission belt appears damaged, or a minimum of much less efficient than in locations the place locals really feel threatened and missed. It’s no coincidence that London, the place all three of those circumstances are in place, seems to be the capital of British Europhilia.
This issues not simply to the present debate on Europe, but in addition what occurs subsequent. If Britain votes for Brexit, or (extra doubtless) votes to stick with a perilously slim margin, many will fault the governments that, it’s and might be mentioned, have let in additional immigrants than the nation is able to absorbing. Such arguments might be insufficient. Issues about strained providers and undermined wages usually are not nearly these providers and wages. Additionally they categorical the rising hole in perceptions and tradition between what I’ve beforehand (right here and elsewhere) referred to as “cosmopolitan” components of the nation and “communitarian” ones. The gulf in attitudes in the direction of immigration and the related divide on the EU is only a symptom of this. And the enticingly easy however quack treatment of slamming the door on the continent and its residents is not any reply. The true one—which in all probability includes letting the generational churn in the direction of liberal attitudes take its impact whereas enhancing grownup schooling and retraining programmes and higher connecting left-behind components of the nation with the booming cities—will show altogether tougher work.
